The data shows an alarming partisan disparity in Taiwanese views on cross-Strait relations.
The News Lens
Date: 2019/01/03
By: Timothy S. Rich
Credit: Wikimedia Commons
One of the main challenges faced by President Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) has been the steady deterioration of cross-Strait relations. From China’s unilateral breaking of a previous diplomatic truce to Chinese live-fire military drills on Taiwan’s doorstep, China has engaged in a campaign of limiting Taiwan’s international presence since Tsai swept to power in 2016.
Within Taiwan, measuring satisfaction with Tsai’s cross-Strait policy predictably follows party lines. Newly released data from National Chengchi University’s Taiwan’s Election and Democratization Study, consisting of telephone interviews conducted in September 2018, shows the extent of this variation.
Question 7 asks about satisfaction with Tsai’s performance specifically on handling cross-Strait relations. Recoding the answers to create a four-point scale (from not satisfied at all to very satisfied), partisan distinctions become clear, with Kuomintang (KMT) and pan-Blue supporters very dissatisfied compared to Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and pan-Green coalition partners, who report high levels of satisfaction.
A common KMT argument concerning the deterioration of relations mirrors that of the Chinese government, which Xi Jinping reiterated in a Taiwan-focused speech delivered yesterday. It blames strained cross-Strait ties on Tsai’s unwillingness to accept the commonly cited “1992 Consensus” – an ambiguous, highly disputed agreement by quasi-official representatives that both sides of the Strait belong to “one China.”
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