Jamestown Foundation
Date: September 6, 2019
By: Timothy Rich, Andi Dahmer
Introduction: China’s Historic Stance on Unification with Taiwan
The position taken by the government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) regarding Taiwan’s

Image: In a demonstration held in the southern Taiwan city of Kaohsiung in April 2019, participants carry signs rejecting the “One Country, Two Systems” framework promoted by Beijing. (Source: RFA)
This could change in the future: China’s political and economic rise, coupled with the removal of term limits for Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary Xi Jinping, potentially changes the strategic calculus for prolonging the status quo. Xi stated in 2013 that a solution cannot wait forever, and reiterated in early 2019 that the PRC reserved all options to achieve unification (China Brief, February 15). The PRC has continued to prepare for a military solution to the Taiwan situation, and earlier this year Xi ordered the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to be ready for such military action (NPR, January 2; Straits Times, January 6).
With these matters in mind, we asked polling recipients in Taiwan about their concerns regarding the possibility of forced unification: a situation in which Chinese threats or coercive actions give Taiwan leaders no choice but to concede to permanent PRC sovereignty over Taiwan. Asking about one’s preferred status for Taiwan constitutes one of the core questions asked on most public opinion surveys in Taiwan since democratization. In recent years, around 15 percent of the population (at most) has stated support for unification, even after a prolonged status quo (Taiwan News, January 3). However, detailed public opinion research on forced unification remains rare. Our own research reveals significant concern about forced unification among Taiwan’s population, albeit with stark differences along the partisan divide of Taiwan politics. [FULL STORY]
