American Enterprise Institute
Date: June 17, 2020
By: Michael Mazza

For nearly three decades—until the severing of diplomatic relations between the United States and the Republic of China (ROC) in 1979—American forces were based in Taiwan. Beginning with the establishment of the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) in 1951, Army, Navy, and Air Force personnel contributed to the defense of Taiwan and strengthened the US forward defense perimeter. The departure of US forces from Taiwan created a gap in the US military presence in the Western Pacific, but a manageable one for a time: for even with Taiwan Defense Command and the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) things of the past, Taiwan remained independent from the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and possessed a military that outclassed its rival across the Taiwan Strait. Even on its own, Taiwan was able to deter Chinese aggression and deny the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) open access to the Western Pacific.

While Taiwan remains independent of the PRC, the PLA has advanced by leaps and bounds during the past two decades. As the use of force to subdue Taiwan becomes more feasible, a Chinese decision to do so also becomes more likely. Today’s commanders of the US Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) must look back with envy at their Cold War predecessors and their access to facilities on the island. If in the coming years the political obstacles to force deployments were to evaporate, what forces might INDOPACOM commanders seek to position in Taiwan?    [FULL  STORY]