The KMT's proposed revision of its policy toward China misses the point. Taiwan has largely moved on from the KMT's basic approach towards China.

The News Lens
Date: 2020/06/20
By: Hiro Fu

The swift downfall of Kaohsiung mayor Han Kuo-yu was only the most recent setback for the Kuomintang (KMT) in 2020. After appearing ascendant in the 2018 elections, the party lost both the presidential and parliamentary elections to the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in January, and watched on the sidelines as credit for Taiwan’s successful Covid-19 response redounded to the DPP.

A poll conducted by the Taiwan Brain Trust in April estimates that less than 10 percent of Taiwanese believe that the KMT best reflects citizens’ personal political ideologies. This sense of crisis is the context for the KMT’s new proposal on the 1992 consensus. 

But the proposal doesn’t address the crux of the KMT’s unpopularity: its continuing fixation on cross-strait discourse, while Taiwan has largely moved on. 

The background: 1992 consensus

The KMT’s cross-strait policy has in recent years rested on the 1992 consensus, which refers to the idea that there is an understanding between the KMT and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), in which each side acknowledges “one China,” but allows each party to provide its own interpretation of what China refers to.    [FULL  STORY]